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DOES EMOTION-REGULATION MODERATE OSTRACISM AND RISK-TAKING?
by
SERENA K. MURPHY
(Under the Direction of Ty Boyer)
ABSTRACT
Ostracism, feeling excluded or ignored, has been associated with increased risk-taking behavior
on a number of self-report and lab-based measures (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Duclos, Wan, &
Jiang, 2012; Falk et al., 2014; Svetieva et al. 2016). Anger mediates the relationship between
ostracism and risk-taking (Svetieva et al., 2016), and it is possible that emotion-regulation
strategies to reduce anger may minimize this relationship. However, research has yet to test if
emotion-regulation strategies can reduce affective responses following ostracism. The purpose of
the current study is to examine the effects of ostracism via Cyberball and emotion-regulation
strategies on risk-taking behavior using the Columbia Card Task (CCT), an objective risk-taking
measure. It was predicted that participants in the ostracism condition would uniquely vary on
risk-taking based on social condition (included vs. ostracism), emotion-regulation instructions
(reappraisal vs. no instructions), and CCT version (Hot vs. Cold). Sixty-five participants were
assigned to one of eight conditions in which they were instructed to either reappraise or given no
instructions to regulate their emotional responses, were either socially included or ostracized, and
then completed the affective (Hot) version of the CCT or the deliberative (Cold) version of the
CCT. Although we found that ostracized participants self-reported greater feelings of anger
compared to socially included participants, we found no difference between social conditions or
emotion-regulation conditions for risk-taking. However, given the limited sample size and

several indicators suggesting the Cold CCT was not an effective measure of risk-taking in the
current study, these results should be interpreted with caution. Research should continue to
explore the relationship between ostracism and anger on affective and deliberative risk-taking.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Risk-Taking
Risk-taking, or any behavior that can produce negative outcomes (Boyer, 2006), can have
serious consequences on individuals and communities. Adolescence and young adulthood are
periods in which individuals are presented with new responsibilities and opportunities to take
risks such as learning to drive, exploring romantic relationships, and making financial decisions.
According to Safer America, on average over 3,000 people die per day from car accidents
worldwide, making car accidents the primary cause of death for teens and young adults (Beltz,
2018).
Although there are positive forms of risk-taking (e.g., pursuing college, asking someone
on a date, moving into your own apartment) which promote personal growth and independence,
it is important to explore the factors that affect risk-taking behavior to minimize negative forms
of it such as reckless driving, excessive drinking, gambling, sexual promiscuity, and illicit drug
use. Adolescence and young adulthood are also sensitive times to peer influence and social
exclusion, which could worsen negative risk-taking behaviors (Blakemore & Mills, 2014).
The Need to Belong
Humans are innately social, and we possess a strong need to form stable, long-lasting
relationships. These relationships are crucial for survival and facilitate physical and
psychological functioning (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007). Baumeister and Leary
(1995) argue that our need to belong is so fundamental to human existence, it is as important as
meeting our basic needs including food, water, and shelter. When individuals feel excluded,
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either physically or psychologically separated from others, a number of negative psychological
and physiological consequences ensue (Buelow, Okdie, Brunell, & Trost, 2015).
Negative Consequences of Ostracism
Wesselmann and Williams (2017) argue that there are two primary categories of social
exclusion: social rejection and ostracism. They argue while references to rejection and ostracism
are often used interchangeably that these terms represent distinct experiences of social exclusion
and may differentially affect psychological outcomes. Social rejection, a direct experience of
social exclusion, is characterized by experiences of being devalued through derogatory
comments, stigmatization, microaggressions, and similar experiences. Ostracism, an indirect
experience of social exclusion, is characterized by feelings of being ignored and excluded while
in the presence of someone else (e.g., no eye contact, being avoided, not being considered for a
decision). Indeed, social rejection, a more severe experience than ostracism, results in emotional
numbing, whereas ostracism results in hypersensitivity and emotional distress (Bernstein &
Claypool, 2012a; Bernstein & Claypool, 2012b).
Williams (2009) suggests there are three stages to experiencing ostracism. In the
Reflexive stage, people first experience negative psychological and physical consequences (e.g.,
increased pain, negative affect, violation of fundamental needs, distorted cognitive processes) in
response to ostracism. During the Reflective stage, people attempt to utilize various cognitive
(appraisal), coping, and behavioral strategies to recover from the pain of ostracism (Hartgerink,
Van Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015). For instance, people may attempt to understand why
they were ostracized (Wesselmann & Williams, 2017). If ostracism occurs over a prolonged
amount of time, people enter stage three, the Resignation stage, in which they experience
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feelings of isolation, depression, worthlessness, and that life is meaningless (Riva, Montali,
Wirth, Curioni, & Williams, 2017).
Ostracism has been associated with increased negative affect, reduction in working
memory, poorer executive functioning, and a violation of fundamental needs including the need
to belong, self-esteem, sense of control, and meaningful existence (Buelow, Okdie, Brunell, &
Trost, 2015; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002). Few studies have examined the long-term
effects of ostracism on fundamental needs, but Buelow et al. (2015) found that the threats to
fundamental needs continued into the second stage of ostracism, the Reflective stage.
Additionally, while some research suggests that social exclusion via social rejection (e.g., future
alone, not being chosen by a group) may lead to emotional numbness (Twenge, Catanese, &
Baumeister, 2003), ostracism has been linked with heightened negative arousal and an increase
in anger and sadness (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Svetieva et al., 2016).
The pain and psychological outcomes of ostracism can be found in a relatively subtle and
common manipulation of ostracism, a task referred to as Cyberball. During Cyberball, a
participant believes he or she is playing a virtual ball-tossing game with several other players.
The participant chooses whom to throw the ball by clicking an avatar representing the other
player. Unbeknownst to them, the task is pre-programmed to either exclude or include the
participant. In the ostracism condition, the participant only receives the ball in the first few
rounds, whereas participants in the inclusion condition receive the ball one-third of the time
(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). A similar task called Atimia has been used to manipulate
ostracism (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Wirth, Turchan, Zimmerman, & Bernstein, 2014). For
Atimia, participants are informed they are completing a virtual online typing game with two
other players that are computer-programmed. Specifically, the player types a letter or
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punctuation mark and then chooses which player will play next. Like Cyberball, participants in
the ostracism condition are selected only a few times by the other players at the beginning, and
included participants are selected one-third of the time.
When individuals feel that they have been rejected for someone else (a comparative
rejection), they report greater negative affect compared to a non-comparative rejection that is
experienced or imagined, and if the situation is ambiguous, individuals often assume that they
were rejected for someone else (Deri & Zitek, 2017). The fundamental need to belong,
threatened more by a comparative rejection, mediated the relationship between rejection type and
negative affect (Deri & Zitek, 2017). Given that participants are informed that they are playing
with two or three other players for Cyberball, the task may induce social pain and negative affect
because the participant believes he or she is being excluded for another player, experiencing a
comparative rejection.
Negative psychological consequences occur not only when participants believe they are
playing against other people, but also when participants are informed that they are playing
against a computer. The threat to four fundamental psychological needs (i.e., belonging, selfesteem, control, and meaningful existence) are also self-reported when participants are told that
they are playing against a computer, which is pre-programmed to only pass them the ball a
certain proportion of times (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Van Beest and Williams
(2006) found that even when it was monetarily advantageous to be ostracized and
disadvantageous to be included, the experience of ostracism in Cyberball was perceived as
painful. Furthermore, ostracism is experienced as painful regardless of individual differences in
personality (McDonald & Donnellan, 2012). However, personality may affect coping responses
to ostracism as Ren, Wesselmann and William (2016) found individuals who are higher on
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introversion are more likely to socially isolate themselves after being ostracized than individuals
lower on introversion (i.e., higher on extraversion). Thus, our reactions to ostracism, at least in
part, appear to be driven by automatic processes, which could be explained by our evolutionary
dependence on others to survive and reproduce.
It is necessary for psychological well-being that people form stable, long-lasting
relationships (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007). This need to belong and connect
with others is so strong that when social inclusion and belongingness are temporarily threatened,
even when people are told the experience of ostracism is due to a mechanized response, it can be
incredibly painful and result in negative psychological and physiological consequences, which
can have powerful effects on decision-making.
Ostracism and Risk-taking
Given the many ill effects of ostracism, it is not surprising that ostracism influences
decision-making processes and has been associated with increased risk-taking. Ostracism has
been linked with increased risk-taking on various lab-based tasks such as probability tasks,
gambling and other financial risk-taking tasks, and driving simulations and has been found when
participants are tested individually and in group settings (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Duclos, Wan,
& Jiang, 2012; Falk et al., 2014)
Several mechanisms could explain the link between ostracism and risk-taking. First,
emotions may affect decision-making, and emotional responses ensuing after an experience of
ostracism could affect information processing and alter risk-taking behavior. Additionally,
people may be highly motivated to become reintegrated with the group or achieve a renewed
sense of belonging following ostracism, so individuals may be especially motivated to take risks
in the presence of others. However, risk-taking behavior is dependent on many factors such as
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the type of risk (e.g., health, financial, sexual), whether the task evokes affective decision
making or deliberate processing, age, sensitivity to peer influence, gender, available cognitive
resources, and other contextual factors.
One of the most ubiquitous opportunities to take risks lies in the realm of financial
decision-making. The relationship between ostracism and greater risk-taking has been supported
in this domain, though the reason for this relationship is unclear. Duclos, Wan, and Jiang (2012)
consistently found that socially excluded individuals preferred the financially riskier options than
socially included individuals (e.g., lotteries, retirement, investments) across five studies and
multiple manipulations of ostracism. The effect of ostracism on risk-taking was found when
tested immediately in the lab and retroactively, based on self-reported financial decisions,
providing support that this relationship exists throughout all of William’s proposed stages of
ostracism. This relationship between ostracism and financial risk-taking could be explained by
changes in affect from ostracism that alter decision making, reliance on spending as a coping
strategy for ostracism, or individuals seeking greater financial gain to reassert status in the social
group.
Then, to what extent, does ostracism affect decision-making, and does this relationship
extend to other risk-taking domains? Kahneman (2011) argues there are the following two types
of processes in decision-making: Type 1 processes which are automatic, guided by emotions, and
often disadvantageous and Type II processes which are controlled, guided by reason, and often
yield advantageous results. Importantly, tasks developed to assess risk-taking in the lab often
differ in their reliance on Type I and Type II processes.
Buelow and Wirth (2017) examined how ostracism could affect performance on risktaking tasks differing in Type I and Type II decision-making processes. In Study 1, the
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researchers explored the effect of ostracism via Cyberball on Type 1 processes using the Balloon
Analog Risk Task (BART). In the BART, participants play a computerized game in which they
decide how many times to press a key to inflate a virtual balloon. The bigger the balloon gets, the
more points the participant receives, but if the balloon pops, the participant does not receive any
points. This task relies on Type 1 processes because the balloon is programmed to explode
randomly, making it impossible to calculate the probability that the balloon will explode.
Because of the uncertainty associated with the risk, participants must rely on affective responses
or “gut feelings” when engaging in this risk task. There was no effect of ostracism on the BART,
an affective risk-taking measure under uncertainty. Ostracized participants compared to included
participants reported lower scores on the fundamental needs scale and greater feelings of
burdensomeness; however, there were no difference in negative affect. The lack of an affective
response could explain why there was no effect of ostracism on this risk-taking task.
Alternatively, participants may have had discrete affective reactions (e.g., anger) that were not
captured by the general negative affect index used. In the second study, Buelow and Wirth
(2017) utilized a similar ostracism task called Atimia to manipulate ostracism. After completing
the Atimia task, the participants completed the BART (Type 1) and the Game of Dice Task
(GDT, Type II). In contrast with the BART, participants choose between riskier and safer bets
for the GDT. This task is thought to rely on Type II decision-making processes, in which
decisions are deliberate and calculated, because participants can predict different combinations
of die being rolled and each bet is independent of the previous choice. Buelow and Wirth (2017)
found that ostracism, manipulated with the Atimia task affected performance on the Game of
Dice Task (Type II). For Atimia, ostracized participants, compared to included participants, also
self-reported higher negative affect, feelings of burdensomeness, and lower satisfaction on the
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fundamental needs scale. Together, these findings indicate that ostracism may have a stronger
effect on Type II processes than Type I processes. The possible difference of ostracism on Type
1 and Type II processes may be because Type II processes recruit more or different cognitive
resources than Type I processes.
Much of decision-making in everyday life involves a combination of Type I and Type II
processes, so the generalizability of some lab risk-taking tasks may be limited. Risk-taking
manipulations that may be more typical or reflective of daily risk-taking behavior include
simulated driving tasks. The effects of ostracism on risk-taking during driving simulations have
been found for both adolescents and adults. Falk et al. (2014) examined the neurological
underpinnings of ostracism on risky driving. Participants played Cyberball while in an fMRI
scanner and returned a week later to complete a simulated driving task in the presence of a
confederate that either endorsed or did not endorse risk. The driving task was rigged so that the
stoplights would turn yellow, and risk-taking was measured as the proportion of the time spent at
the intersection when the light was red during the game. Greater activity in brain regions
associated with mentalizing (e.g., Anterior Insula + subACC) and social-affective (e.g., DMPFC
+ rTPJ + PCC) processes during Cyberball predicted risky driving during the presence of a peer,
beyond baseline driving measures and confederate risk-attitude. This indicates that peer presence
affects risk-taking behavior and that emotional reactions to ostracism may drive this relationship.
In contrast to Buelow and Wirth (2017), the findings on risky driving show that ostracism may
impact automatic, gut-level Type I processes as well and applies to situations in which the
amount of risk involved is uncertain or cannot be calculated.
Moreover, emotional reactions to ostracism can influence risk-taking behaviors in other
ways. Negative emotions ensue after ostracism, which can produce hypersensitivity, especially if
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the individual is sensitive to peer influence, and result in even greater negative affect. In a similar
neuroimaging study utilizing Cyberball and the Stoplight task, Peake et al. (2013) found that
participants who performed poorly driving in the presence of peers after being ostracized showed
increased activation in the ACC and IPFC, areas related to emotional distress and emotionregulation. Thus, negative emotions from ostracism may be further exacerbated by an increased
concern regarding others’ judgments when performance suffers. Adolescents may be particularly
sensitive to how they perform in the presence of others after being ostracized and these
emotional reactions may affect driving behaviors, having dire consequences.
Furthermore, the effects of ostracism on risky driving continue into adulthood. Svetieva
and colleagues (2016) sought to identify specific mediating factors between ostracism and risktaking behavior in young adults. They predicted that anger (an approach-oriented emotion), but
not sadness or need for control, would mediate the relationship between ostracism and risktaking. In Study 1, participants played Cyberball and then completed self-report measures on
anger and the Evaluation of Risks Questionnaire (EVAR). They found that anger, but not need
for control, mediated ostracism and self-reported risk-taking propensity. In Study 2, participants
completed the Cyberball task and then played a driving simulation video game. It was found that
anger, not sadness, mediated the relationship between ostracism and increased risk-taking during
this driving simulation. Importantly, this is the first study to differentiate between the effects of
anger and sadness on risk-taking, whereas other studies have either not measured anger or only
analyzed generalized negative affect rather than discrete emotions. Thus, it may be that anger
resulting from ostracism, rather than general negative affect, impacts risk-taking behaviors.
Emotions and Risk-taking
Several theoretical frameworks exist regarding how emotions impact decision-making

15
such as the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF, Learner and Keltner, 2000), the Affect
Infusion Model (AIM, Forgas, 1995), and the Broaden-and-Build theory (Fredrickson, 2004).
These theories postulate that affective states differentially influence cognitive processes. Because
the Broaden-and-Build theory focuses solely on the effects of positive emotions, it is less
pertinent to the affective consequences of ostracism on decision-making. The Affect Infusion
Model (AIM) has been used to investigate risk-taking behavior; however, it focuses on the
general effects of mood for decision-making, and such research has been mixed (Angie,
Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011). Thus, researchers began to isolate the different effects of
discrete emotions on risk-taking. Negative emotions such as anger, anxiety, fear, sadness, and
disgust have been associated with different risk-taking behaviors.
The Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) is a particularly strong theoretical framework
because it accounts for how different negative emotions can impact decision-making. According
to this framework, emotions have specific cognitive characteristics associated with them that
guide behaviors, or action tendencies. For ATF, discrete emotions are associated with different
risk-taking outcomes as a function of the appraisal that accompanies it. According to the ATF,
negative emotions (e.g., anger and sadness) can have different outcomes on decision-making,
whereas emotions differing in valence (e.g., anger and happiness) can have similar outcomes.
Specific emotions are associated with different feelings of control and certainty for future events.
For instance, anger is associated with appraisals of high certainty and control, whereas fear is
associated with appraisals of low certainty and control (Learner & Keltner, 2000). Thus, when
someone experiences anger, he or she is likely to perceive future events as predictable and
controllable, creating a low perception of risk. In contrast, someone who experiences fear is
likely to perceive future events as unpredictable and uncontrollable, perceiving risk as high.
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Anger and happiness, both associated with high appraisals of certainty produce heuristic
processing, in which participants rely on emotional cues from previous decisions. Sadness and
fear, associated with feelings of unpredictability and lack of control, indicating the possibility of
a risky situation, yield more systematic processing to ensure that all risks are evaluated.
In line with the ATF, a meta-analysis revealed that anger is associated with increased
risk-taking (Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011). However, the effects of anger on risktaking are context-dependent, dependent on the type of task. Lab-based behavioral measures of
risk-taking differ in terms of task uncertainty and deliberative risk-taking and affective and nonaffective components. For instance, the BART involves uncertainty as participants do not know
at what point the balloon will pop. Importantly, this uncertainty is inherent in the task and is
distinct from appraisals of certainty associated with specific emotions. Examples of deliberative
risk-taking involve tasks with calculable risk probabilities such as the Game of Dice Task,
common lottery tasks, and the Columbia Card Task (Schiebener & Brand, 2015). The Columbia
Card Task is a particularly strong behavioral risk-taking measure as it provides greater insight
into what information is used for decision-making including gain, loss, and probability (Figner,
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009).
In the Columbia Card Task (CCT), participants see a virtual array of cards, lying face
down, and are instructed that the cards include gain cards, for which they can earn points, and
loss cards, which end the trial. Participants can select the number of cards to flip over to win
points based on the number of loss cards (probability), points earned for each card (gain) and
points lost for a bad card (loss). Risk-taking is measured based on the number of cards chosen to
flip over (i.e., the more cards a participant flips, the riskier the participant is scored). Moreover,
the Columbia Card Task has been developed to assess risk-taking in tasks that involve affective
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(hot, heuristic processing) and non-affective (cold, systematic) processing (Figner et al., 2009).
In the Hot CCT, participants are able to flip over individual cards, receiving feedback if each
card is a loss or gain card. In the Cold CCT, participants select the number of cards for each trial
but are not provided feedback regarding the outcome of the decision (i.e., they do not receive a
score at the end of the trial). Generally, people tend to be riskier on the Hot CCT than on the
Cold CCT (Figner et al., 2009).
Baumann and DeSteno (2012) sought to further illuminate the paradoxical effects of
anger on deliberative risk-taking using the CCT. Although anger is associated with increased
risk-taking, it is also associated with increased estimates that negative events will occur
(perceiving risk as high). Based on the Conceptual Act Model, they proposed that anger would
decrease risk-taking on the Hot CCT, as participants rely more on the affective components of
anger in which anger is used as an “informational cue” that risk is high, and would decrease risktaking on the Cold CCT as participants rely more on the conceptual components of anger
(appraising control and certainty as high). Supporting this prediction, Baumann and DeSteno
(2012) found that participants who had written about an experience that had made them feel
angry for four minutes were riskier on the Cold CCT than participants that wrote about a typical
day. In contrast, angry participants were less risky on the Hot CCT than their neutral
counterparts. Angry participants were still riskier on the Hot CCT than the Cold CCT, replicating
the findings of Figner et al. (2009), such that riskiness was in the following order based on
condition and task: neutral – Hot CCT (riskiest) > Angry – Hot CCT > Angry – Cold CCT > and
Neutral – Cold CCT (least risky). Thus, it appears that anger may have opposing effects on
deliberative risk-taking, depending on the context of the risk-taking task. However, this diverges
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slightly from the Appraisal Tendency Framework, has only been tested once, and the researchers
used only four trials of the CCT rather than the 24 round version now commonly used.
As we have discussed, ostracism increases negative affect, specifically anger and sadness.
It was found that anger, not sadness, mediated the relationship between ostracism and greater
risk-taking on a driving simulation. Specific emotions, not affective valence, have distinct effects
on information processing and risk-taking behavior as supported by the Appraisal Tendency
Framework. Anger is often associated with increased risk-taking, but these effects are dependent
on the type of risk-taking being assessed. Moreover, considering the stages of ostracism, it is
likely that people employ emotion-regulation strategies to reduce negative feelings, particularly
during the second stage of ostracism, the Reflective stage, which could affect risk-taking
behavior. Indeed, emotion-regulation success for anger may moderate the relationship between
ostracism and risk-taking behaviors.
Emotion-Regulation Strategies
Emotion-regulation is broadly defined as our ability to control and maintain which
emotions we experience and when and how we experience those (Gross, 2002). Emotionregulation can be automatic or intentional. There are a number of emotion-regulation strategies
that vary in temporal relation to the emotion experienced. According to the process model of
emotion-regulation, emotion strategies are antecedent-focused, occurring before the emotion is
fully experienced physiologically and psychologically, or response-focused, occurring after the
emotion-response tendency (Gross, 2002). To regulate emotional responses, people can
selectively choose situations such as seeking known positive environments and avoiding
potentially anxiety inducing situations (e.g., avoiding an event in which someone disliked will be
attending). Alternatively, people can modify existing situations (e.g., have a friend join an
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uncomfortable social situation to lessen the tension), change attentional focus (e.g., look away
from a sad movie scene), cognitively reevaluate the situation (e.g., reassess an event as more
positive or negative), or attempt to change emotional responses (e.g., meditate to relieve
anxiety).
One emotion-regulation strategy that has been explored in-depth is cognitive reappraisal.
Reappraisal is reevaluating the meaning of something that is potentially emotion inducing in a
way that does not elicit an emotional response. Reappraisal is considered an antecedent-focused
emotion-regulation strategy, meaning that it occurs before an affective response is fully formed.
Reappraisal effectively down-regulates (reduces) negative affect and increases positive affect
(Gross, 2002; Richards and Gross, 2000). People also differ in habitual uses of reappraisal, and
reappraisal is associated with strong psychological well-being (Gross & John, 2003). Therefore,
cognitive reappraisal should be a particularly strong emotion-regulation strategy to utilize
following ostracism. But to what extent do people utilize emotion-regulation strategies in
response to ostracism?
Ostracism and Emotion-Regulation
Emotion-regulation can be automatic, beyond awareness, or deliberative. DeWall et al.
(2011) examined automatic emotion-regulation responses in response to ostracism. Some
individuals may automatically utilize emotion-regulation strategies in an attempt to reduce the
aversive effects of ostracism on mood. They found that, although participants were unaware of
the cognitive change, they displayed an increase in positive affect following ostracism, based on
the number of positive emotions recalled from childhood and completion of ambiguous word
stems. This automatic shift to positive information was found across nine studies but was only
found for participants low in depressive symptoms and high self-esteem. Therefore, individuals
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that could benefit the most from such an automatic emotion-regulation process likely do not
utilize it.
Emotion-regulation strategies are also consciously employed following ostracism.
Goodman and Southam-Gerow (2010) found that even relatively young children (7-12 years old)
utilize a variety of coping and emotion-regulation strategies in response to social rejection
(teasing) and ostracism. Gender may influence the effect of ostracism on cognitive processes as
ostracism decreases working memory for girls but not boys (Hawes et al., 2012). Hawes and
colleagues suggest that this difference in working memory may occur because girls rely on
different emotion-regulation strategies than boys after being ostracized. Additionally, several
neurological studies on ostracism suggest that adolescents differ in their ability to effectively
regulate negative emotional responses (Masten et al. 2009; Peake et al., 2013). Young adults
were less able to effectively regulate emotional responses to social stimuli compared to nonsocial stimuli, especially if they were more sensitive to rejection (Silvers et al., 2012). Thus,
emotion-regulation strategies are used following ostracism, but doing so effectively may be
difficult and may differ based on gender, age, and rejection sensitivity.
Emotion-Regulation and Risk-taking
Based on the interactive influence model of emotion and cognition (IIEC), Luo and Yu
(2015) suggest that emotion-regulation strategies influence cognitive processes when emotional
responses are particularly strong or when cognitive resources are weakened. Therefore, emotionregulation is likely to play a role in ostracism and risk-taking because ostracism elicits strong
affective responses, while reducing cognitive functioning including working memory and
executive functioning (Gerber and Wheeler, 2009).
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Exploration of habitual emotion-regulation strategies indicates that emotion-regulation
may impact decision-making in important ways. Habitual reappraisal, usually considered an
effective emotion-regulation strategy, has been associated with increased risk-taking and
suppression, often a poor emotion-regulation strategy, has been associated with decreased risktaking on the Cold CCT (Panno, Lauriola, & Figner, 2013). Similarly, habitual suppression has
been linked with less financial riskiness (Li, Sang, & Zhang, 2015). Although the studies are
only correlational, this research provides some support that emotion-regulation strategies may
affect real world decision-making.
Several studies have investigated the role of emotion-regulation strategies and their effect
on decision-making in the lab. Heilman et al. (2010) investigated if emotion-regulation
instructions moderate the effect of emotion and risk-taking. The emotions fear and disgust were
induced with film clips, and participants were instructed to either reappraise, suppress, or given
no instructions to utilize an emotion-regulation strategy. Heilman and colleagues found that
reappraisal but not suppression was effective for reducing negative affect (fear or disgust) from
watching the film clip. Participants who were instructed to reappraise displayed greater risktaking on the BART (i.e., more pumps) than participants in the suppression or no instructions
condition. Thus, reappraising feelings of fear and disgust (associated with appraisals of low
control) effectively down-regulated these negative emotions and reduced the associated riskaversion.
Guided by the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF), Szasz, Hofmann, Heilman, and
Curtiss (2016) further examined the effects of emotion-regulation strategies on risk-taking using
the BART. Specifically, they induced feelings of sadness or anger (via autobiographical
memory) and instructed participants to either reappraise, accept, ruminate, or gave them no
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instructions. Based on the ATF, they predicted that anger (linked with appraisals of higher
certainty and control) would be associated with increased risk-taking, whereas sadness (linked
with appraisals of low certainty and control) would be associated with decreased risk-taking.
Given that reappraisal reduces negative affect, they predicted that reappraising anger would
decrease risk-taking, whereas reappraising sadness would increase risk-taking relative to the
other emotion-regulation strategies employed on the BART. Contrary to their predictions, they
found that reappraisal was associated with the greatest risk-taking behavior compared to the
other emotion-regulations strategies for both anger and sadness. These findings further support
that reappraising negative emotions increases risk-taking (Heilman et al., 2010). Reappraisal may
be associated with cognitive processes that independently affect or interact with the effects of
emotions on risk-taking. For instance, habitual reappraisal has also been associated with less
sensitivity to fluctuations in probability and loss amount (Panno et al., 2013). Thus, it is unclear,
and worthy of further exploration, if reappraising negative emotions increases risk-taking,
regardless of the specific negative emotion, and if discrete emotions can differentially affect risktaking as the Appraisal Tendency Framework suggests.
Another explanation that reappraising anger did not decrease risk-taking in the Szasz et
al. (2016) study is the risk-taking measure utilized. As discussed previously, risk-taking
measures differ on uncertainty or deliberative risk-taking and on their reliance of affective
information. The BART measures risk-taking under uncertainty; however, perhaps anger has
distinct effects on deliberative risk-taking as measured by the Hot and Cold versions of the
Columbia Card Task. This explanation is also supported by the findings of Bulow and Wirth
(2017) that ostracism, associated with anger, increased risk-taking on the Game of Dice task
(deliberative, Type II) but not on the BART (automatic, Type I process).
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The Current Study
Previous research has shown that ostracism increases anger (Svetieva, 2015; Gerber &
Wheeler, 2009), which can have diverging effects on deliberative risk-taking, depending if the
risk-taking task is affective or non-affective (Baumann & DeSteno, 2012). Past studies that have
examined the role of affect in ostracism and risk-taking have focused on general negative affect
rather than specific negative emotions (Blackhart et al., 2009; Buelow & Wirth, 2017), which
may have obscured the role of discrete negative emotions like anger between ostracism and risktaking. Additionally, previous research investigating emotion-regulation has predominantly
focused on risk-taking under uncertainty, but has consistently found that reappraisal, regardless
of negative emotion, is associated with increased risk-taking (Heilman et al. 2010; Panno et al.,
2013; Szasas et al., 2016).
Research has yet to test if instructing individuals to use different emotion-regulation
strategies could alter the relationship between ostracism and risk-taking. The present study aims
to fill this gap by exploring if cognitive reapprasial can effectively down-regulate ostracismrelated anger and impact the link between ostracism and risk-taking. In the current study,
participants were either socially included or ostracized (via Cyberball), instructed to either
reappraise or given no instructions to regulate their emotional responses, and completed either
the Hot or Cold CCT.
I have four aims in this study. First, this study aims to extend previous findings on
ostracism and risk-taking to affective and non-affective deliberative decision-making. To my
knowledge, previous studies of ostracism and risk-taking have not utilized the Columbia Card
Task to assess risk-taking behavior. Secondly, this study aims to replicate the effects of ostracism
for increasing anger reported by Svetieva et al. (2016). Thirdly, this study will further illuminate
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if ostracism-induced anger (associated with high certainty appraisals) has differential effects on
the Hot and Cold CCT or if reappraisal will be associated with high risk-taking regardless of
task. Lastly, this study will assess if simple emotion-regulation instructions are sufficient to
moderate the effects of ostracism on risk-taking.
Predictions:
As discussed, anger has been shown to mediate the effect of ostracism and risk-taking
(Svetieva et al., 2016) and has been associated with increased risk-taking on the Cold CCT and
decreased risk-taking on the Hot CCT (Baumann & DeSteno, 2012). Additionally, reappraisal
has been shown to effectively down-regulate anger.
Hypothesis 1: Based on these findings, I predict that ostracized participants will be riskier
than socially included participants on the Cold CCT. Participants instructed to cognitively
reappraise ostracism, decreasing feelings of anger, will be less risky than participants given no
instructions for ostracism.
Hypothesis 2: Conversely, for the Hot CCT, I predict that ostracized participants will be
less risky than socially included participants. Participants who are ostracized and instructed to
reappraise ostracism will be riskier than participants given no instructions for ostracism.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-two participants1(48 females, 24 males; M age =19.43, SD age = 1.45), ranging
in age from 18 to 25 years old, from Georgia Southern University were assigned to one of eight
conditions as a function of arbitrarily assigned participant numbers. Importantly, the researchers
who interacted with the participants were unaware of what numbers corresponded with each of
the conditions. Thirty-six participants identified as White (50.0%), 25 as Black or African
American (34.7 %), and 11 as Multiracial (15.3%). Of these participants, sixty-seven participants
(93.0%) identified as Not Hispanic or Latino, 2 participants (2.7%) identified as Hispanic or
Latino, and 3 participants (4.2%) opted to not respond. All participants were undergraduate
students and were recruited through SONA Systems during the Spring of 2019. The study was
advertised on SONA as in-person study on computerized choice tasks. Participants were awarded
course credit for completing the study.
Four criteria were determined to eliminate careless responders prior to data analysis.
Participants were excluded if they incorrectly answered both catch questions on the PANAS (4
participants), indicated that their data should not be used (2 participants), selected the same
number of cards for a string of six rounds (2 participants), or were three standard deviations from
the mean number of cards selected (no participants). One participant violated two of the above
criteria. These exclusionary criteria eliminated 7 participants from the overall analysis. As seen
in Table 1, excluded participants did not systematically belong to any one condition. After

This sample size was used for the purposes of completing this master’s thesis. Data collection
continued until the desired sample size, approximately 120 participants, was reached for final
project completion.
1

26
excluded participants were removed, there were 65 participants remaining (46 females, 19
males). Of these participants, there were 34 freshman, 14 sophomores, 12 juniors, and 5 seniors.
Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, the experimenter or a research assistant greeted
participants and obtained informed consent. All experimental tasks and questionnaires were
completed individually, presented on a computer, and programmed using E-Prime 3.0.
Participants were assigned by E-Prime to one of eight conditions as noted above, and the study
lasted approximately 15-30 minutes. All research assistants were blind to participant condition.
The full procedural outline is available in Appendix A.
After obtaining informed consent, participants were seated at a cubical to complete the
experiment. Participants began by putting on headphones and entering their age. Then,
participants were simultaneously presented with instructions for the Cyberball task and to either
emotionally regulate their responses or given no emotion-regulation instructions. As
recommended by Williams and Jarvis (2006), participants were instructed that they were
completing a mental visualization task and that their ball-throwing performance did not matter
during the Cyberball game. Cyberball and emotion-regulation instructions were presented in text
on the computer screen and heard via an audio recording. The experiment was programmed such
that participants could not continue until the audio recording finished playing.
Emotion-regulation Instructions. Participants were assigned to either cognitively
reappraise their emotions or given no emotion-regulation instructions. Cognitive reappraisal
instructions were adapted from Richards and Gross (2000) and appeared on the computer screen
prior to completing the Cyberball task. For the cognitive reappraisal condition, participants were
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asked to think about the game objectively. Heilman et al. (2010) successfully replicated the
effectiveness of these emotion-regulation instructions for fear and disgust.
Specifically, participants assigned to the cognitive reappraisal emotion-regulation
strategy received these additional instructions adapted from Richards and Gross (2000): “In
addition, we would like to see how well you can control the way you view things. Therefore, it is
very important to us that you try your best to adopt a neutral attitude as you play the game. To
do this, we would like for you to play with the detached interest of a medical professional. In
other words, as you play the game, try to think about it objectively and analytically rather than
as personally, or in any way, emotionally relevant to you. So, as you play the game please try to
think about what you are seeing in such a way that you don’t feel anything at all.”
Ostracism. After receiving the Cyberball and emotion-regulation instructions,
participants either completed the social inclusion or ostracism condition. Ostracism was
manipulated based on Cyberball 4.0. Cyberball is a virtual ball tossing game in which
participants believe they are throwing a ball back and forth with two other players. For the social
inclusion condition, participants received the ball from the pre-programmed players, represented
by an avatar, one-third of the time and continued to select whom to throw the ball by pressing a
corresponding number on the keyboard. For the ostracism condition, participants were only
thrown the ball for the first two passes, but then did not receive the ball the rest of the game (for
approximately 30 ball tosses). This task has been used extensively and has been validated by
Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000). Towards the end of the experiment, participants were asked,
“Who did you think the players were in the Cyberball game?” with “Real People” and
“Computer” response options. Fifty-seven of the 65 participants (88%) responded with
“Computer.”
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Anger Measure. Given that previous research suggests that anger induced from ostracism
specifically guides risk-taking behavior (Svetieva et al., 2016; Szasz et al., 2016), participants
were asked to rate the extent to which they enjoyed playing and felt angry during the Cyberball
game from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much so) immediately following Cyberball, respectively.
These questions were adapted from Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2003). The enjoyment
question was not analyzed; however, it was included so that participants did not become
suspicious about the purpose of the Cyberball task.
Emotion-regulation Manipulation Check. After completing the enjoyment and anger
measures, participants completed three reappraisal items, modified from the State Suppression
and Reappraisal Scale (Eglogg, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwedtfeger, 2006) to assess the extent to
which participants utilized the instructed emotion-regulation strategy. This scale consists of two
3-item measures for suppression and reappraisal and has shown acceptable internal consistency
in previous research (Cronbach’s α ≥ 0.73, Egloff et al., 2006). The original scale was slightly
modified for the current study, similarly to the modifications made by Srivastav (2017), which
also showed good internal consistency (α ≥ .75 for each subscale). Participants were asked to
indicate to what extent that each item applied to them during Cyberball from 1 (Not at all) to 5
(Extremely). The three items on the cognitive reappraisal scale appeared in the following order
and included: I tried to see the task as objectively as possible, I viewed the Cyberball as just part
of the experiment, and I thought of the task in a way that made me stay calm. In the current
study, we had weak internal reliability for the three reappraisal items (Cronbach’s α = .53).
When removing the second reappraisal item, internal reliability slightly increased (Cronbach’s α
= .63). Reliability analysis were conducted for the Reappraisal scale (first and third item only)
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for each emotion-regulation condition (No instruction condition Cronbach’s α = .714,
Reappraisal condition Cronbach’s α = .245).
Columbia Card Task (CCT). Upon completion of the emotion-regulation check questions,
participants completed a behavioral measure of risk-taking known as the Columbia Card Task, a
virtual card playing game (Figner et al., 2009). The CCT was specifically selected to examine the
effects of ostracism on affective processes (Hot CCT) and more deliberative processes (Cold
CCT). The Hot CCT is associated with greater electrodermal activity (EDA) than the Cold CCT
and baseline EDA levels. Additionally, self-reported decision-strategies supported relatively
different decision-making strategies on the Hot and Cold CCT as the Hot CCT was associated
with relying on “gut-level” strategies and the Cold CCT was associated with relying more on
mathematical strategies (Figner et al., 2009).
For the current study, the CCT was programmed in E-Prime 3.0 based on the most
updated and shortened 24 game round version (described in Figner & Weber, 2011; Somerville
et al., 2018) rather than the older 54 game round version (Figner et al., 2009). For each trial or
round, 32 virtual cards were shown face down. At the top of the screen, participants saw
information regarding the number of loss cards (1 or 3), the gain amount (10 or 30), and the loss
amount (-250 or -750), which were factorially crossed, yielding eight different combinations,
which appeared in three randomized blocks. Risk-taking was determined by the number of cards
chosen (i.e., the more cards a participant chose, the riskier the participant was scored). Reliability
analyses were conducted on each version of the CCT (Cold CCT Cronbach’s α = .815, Hot CCT
Cronbach’s α = .663)
Participants were assigned to complete the cold or hot version of the Columbia Card Task
as a function of their arbitrarily assigned number. In the cold version of the Columbia Card Task,
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participants selected a number from 0 to 32 displayed above the array of cards for each of the 24
rounds. After each trial, participants saw a screen that displayed the number of cards they chose,
but no feedback was provided about potential points earned. In the hot version of the CCT,
designed to evoke affective responses, participants individually selected which card to flip over
and immediately received feedback if it was a win or loss card. Each of the 24 rounds began
with a score of zero. Unlike the cold version, participants saw a score for each round. If a win
card was chosen, the round total was updated accordingly at the top of the screen. Participants
could continue to flip over cards until they decided to stop and proceed to the next round or until
a loss card was chosen. If a loss card was flipped over, the round was terminated, and the loss
amount was subtracted from the round total. A cumulative score was never shown to
participants. Instructions used for the CCT can be found in Appendix B (Hot CCT instructions)
and Appendix C (Cold CCT instructions).
Self-Reported Affect Measure. After completing either the cold or hot version of the
CCT, participants completed the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess the effect of Cyberball and emotion-regulation
instructions on state negative affect. The PANAS includes two 10-item subscales widely utilized
to assess general positive and negative affect and has been validated, showing strong internal
consistency (Crawford & Henry, 2004) and strong convergent validity (Watson et al., 1988). In
the current study, we had strong internal reliability (Cronbach’s α= .87) for general negative
affect.
Participants rated the extent they felt each emotion on a scale from 1 (Very slightly or not
at all) to 5 (Extremely). A General Negative Affect subscale was determined by summing scores
to the following negative emotions: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed,
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nervous, jittery, and afraid. To identify careless responders, two catch items were placed within
the PANAS measure, indicating that participants should “Press 2” or “Press 5” for that item.
Ostracism Manipulation Check. Next, participants were asked to rate the extent that they
felt ignored and the extent that they felt excluded, respectively. Participants were also asked to
estimate the percentage of throws they received during the Cyberball task assuming that included
participants received the ball about 33% of the time. Participants also reported if they believed
the other Cyberball players were real or computer-programmed and if their data should be used.
Demographic information. Lastly, participants completed information regarding their
sex, ethnicity, racial identity, and class standing. Age was recorded at the beginning of the
experiment, but all other demographic questions were completed at the end of the study.
After completing the study, participants were debriefed regarding the purposes of the
study. Participants were also informally asked during the debriefing process the following
questions: what did you think about the experiment, did you use any particular strategies for any
of the tasks, and what do you think the study is about? No participant fully suspected the key
variables being tested in the study. During the debriefing, participants also had the opportunity to
be led through a short breathing exercise to mitigate any negative affect that participants may
have experienced.
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Table 1
The Conditions and Sex of Excluded Participants

Participant
ID

Sex

Ostracized?

Emotionregulation
Instructions

CCT Version

114
120
126
132
142
151
170

M
F
M
F
M
M
M

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Control
Reappraisal
Reappraisal
Control
Reappraisal
Control
Control

Hot CCT
Cold CCT
Cold
Hot
Cold
Cold
Hot

Totals

2 F, 4 M

3 Included, 4
Excluded

4 Control, 3
Reappraisal

3 Hot, 4 Cold

Note. Excluded participants did not systematically belong to any of the eight experimental
conditions.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Ostracism Manipulation Check. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to
determine if participants in the ostracism condition felt significantly more excluded and ignored
than those in the social inclusion condition. Self-reported feelings of being excluded and ignored
were combined. As expected, participants in the ostracism condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.14) selfreported greater feelings of ostracism than participants in the social inclusion condition (M =
1.97, SD = 1.02), t(63) = -6.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.61.
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was also used to determine if participants in the
social inclusion condition estimated receiving the ball a higher percentage of times than
participants in the ostracism condition. As expected, participants who were socially included (M
= 27.32%, SD = 11.55%) estimated receiving a greater percentage of throws than ostracized
participants (M = 9.16%, SD = 4.95%), t(63) = 8.10, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.04. Taken together,
these results suggest that the manipulation of ostracism was effective.
Emotion-regulation Manipulation Check. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was
used to determine if participants utilized the cognitive reappraisal instructions. Given the low
Cronbach’s alpha found for the reappraisal measure, the second reappraisal question was
removed, and the first and third reappraisal measures were summed to create a reappraisal
composite score, with an overall scale range of 2 to 10. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test
revealed, as expected, participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition (M = 7.47, SD = 1.27)
self-reported higher scores for reappraisal than participants in the no instruction condition (M =
6.55, SD = 1.86), t(63) = -2.33, p = .023, Cohen’s d = 0.58.
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Anger Manipulation Check. A 2 (social condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (emotionregulation instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) fully between-subjects ANOVA was
conducted to analyze mean differences for self-reported anger, measured on a scale from 1(Not
at all) to 9 (Very Much So). A significant interaction was predicted such that those in the
ostracism-no instructions condition would self-report significantly higher anger ratings than
those in the ostracism-reappraisal condition and social inclusion conditions. Table 2 provides
marginal means and standard deviations for anger based on social condition and emotionregulation instructions.
There was a significant main effect for social condition F(1, 61) = 7.55, p = .008, ηp 2 =
.110 such that participants in the ostracism condition self-reported greater feelings of anger (M =
4.13, SD = 2.53) than those in the social inclusion condition (M = 2.47, SD = 2.26). Self-reported
anger did not differ between those given instructions to cognitively reappraise (M = 3.25, SD =
2.63) compared to those given no emotion-regulation instructions (M = 3.27, SD = 2.44), F(1,
61) < .001, p = .995, ηp 2 = .000. Finally, I expected a two-way interaction such that cognitive
reappraisal instructions would reduce self-reported anger for participants in the ostracism
condition. Contrary to this prediction, and as illustrated by Figure 1, self-reported anger did not
differ across instruction conditions within social conditions, F(1, 61) < .001, p = .995, ηp2 < .001.
General Negative Affect. A 2 (Social condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (Emotionregulation Instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted
to analyze mean differences on the general negative affect subscale, which ranged from 10 to 50.
The purpose of this analysis was to further evaluate the claims of Svetieva et al. (2016) that it is
specifically anger, not general negative affect, which changes following ostracism. Because
several studies have failed to find a change in self-reported general negative affect following
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ostracism (Buelow & Wirth, 2017), it was predicted that there would be no interaction between
social condition and emotion-regulation instructions for general negative affect. There was no
difference between self-reported negative affect on the PANAS between the ostracism condition
(M = 18.48, SD = 6.61) and the social inclusion condition (M = 19.32, SD = 8.55), F(1, 61) = .21,
p = .65, ηp 2 = .003. There was no difference for self-reported negative affect for participants in
the reappraisal condition (M = 17.94, SD = 7.78) and those given no emotion-regulation
instructions (M = 19.88, SD = 7.50), F(1, 61) = 1.06, p = .31, ηp 2 = .017. Supporting the
prediction, participants did not uniquely vary in general negative affect based on social condition
and emotion-regulation instructions, F(1, 61) = .07, p = .79, ηp 2 = .001.
Primary Analyses
Ostracism, Emotion-regulation, and Risk-Taking. A 2 (Social Condition: inclusion vs.
ostracism) x 2 (Emotion-regulation Instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) x 2 (CCT
version: Hot vs. Cold) between-subjects full factorial ANOVA was conducted on risk-taking. In
a neutral affective state, participants are riskier, selecting more cards on average, on the Hot CCT
than on the Cold CCT (Figner et al., 2009). Thus, I expected unique changes in the number of
cards selected based on social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version such
that ostracized participants would be riskier than socially included participants on the Cold CCT.
Additionally, I predicted that participants instructed to cognitively reappraise ostracism would be
less risky than participants given no instructions for ostracism on the Cold CCT. Conversely, for
the Hot CCT, I predicted that ostracized participants would be less risky than socially included
participants. I predicted that participants who were ostracized and instructed to reappraise would
be riskier than participants given no instructions for ostracism. Results did not support the
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proposed predictions. Table 3 provides marginal means and standard deviations for risk-taking
for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version.
Contrary to previous findings, there was a significant main effect for CCT version F(1,
57) = 21.36, p < .001, ηp 2 = .273 such that participants were riskier on the Cold CCT (M = 13.62,
SD = 3.93), selecting a greater number of cards on average, than participants on the Hot CCT (M
= 9.79, SD = 2.22). This indicates that participants diverged in risk-taking behavior based on
CCT version as previously reported by Figner et al. (2009). Risk-taking behavior did not
significantly differ for participants in the social inclusion condition (M = 12.10, SD = 3.28) and
those in the ostracism condition (M = 11.20, SD = 4.11) F(1, 57) = 1.19, p = .280, ηp 2 = .020.
This indicates that ostracism did not affect risk-taking behavior collapsing across versions of the
CCT. Risk-taking behavior did not significantly differ for participants in the cognitive
reappraisal condition (M = 11.20, SD = 3.66) and those who received no instructions (M = 12.13,
SD = 3.73), F(1, 57) = .93, p = .340, ηp 2 = .016. This indicates that cognitive reappraisal
instructions did not change risk-taking behavior. Lastly, I expected that cognitive reappraisal
would reduce the effects of ostracism for each version of the CCT. Contrary to this prediction,
the three-way social condition x instruction condition x CCT version interaction was not
statistically significant, F(1, 57) = 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .006, with limited variability between
emotion-regulation instruction conditions as a function of social condition and CCT condition, as
illustrated by Figure 2.
Ostracism, Emotion-regulation, and Risk-Taking Excluding Loss Trials. A 2 (social
condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (emotion-regulation instructions: reappraisal vs. no
instructions) x 2 (CCT version: Hot vs. Cold) between-subjects full factorial ANOVA was
conducted on risk-taking excluding trials in which a loss card was chosen, which only affected
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data for the Hot CCT. This analysis was conducted as another indication of risk-taking behavior
because participants may have unlucky trials in which they quickly hit a loss card, given the
random location of loss cards across trials, which may obscure participants’ true risk-taking
behaviors. For instance, if a participant hit a loss card after selecting two cards, it would appear
that participant was not very risky on that round for the previous analysis, selecting only 2 of 32
cards; however, had the participant been able to continue on that round, he or she may have
selected many more cards.
Fifty-nine participants were included for this analysis as six participants selected a loss
card on all 24 CCT rounds, and thus could not be included. I predicted a three-way interaction
for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version for risk-taking. Results
did not support the proposed predictions. Table 4 provides marginal means and standard
deviations for risk-taking for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version
excluding loss trials. However, this data should be interpreted with caution because eliminating
trials in which participants chose a loss card (i.e., kept turning over cards until a loss card was
chosen) produced missing data for many of cells of the eight possible win amount, loss amount,
and number of loss card combinations. In fact, participants opted to hit “Stop and Move On” for
only 25% of the trials. Thus, eliminating trials in which a loss card was selected removed 75% of
the trials for the Hot CCT.
The analysis revealed no difference for number of cards selected between the Cold CCT
(M =13.62, SD = 3.93) and Hot CCT (M = 12.32, SD = 6.36) when excluding trials in which a
loss card was chosen, F(1, 57) = .59, p = .45, ηp 2 = .011. This indicates that CCT version did not
affect risk-taking behavior when excluding loss trials. Risk-taking behavior did not significantly
differ for participants in the social inclusion condition (M = 13.12, SD = 4.56) and those in the
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ostracism condition (M = 12.92, SD = 5.82), F(1, 57) = .023, p = .88, ηp 2 = .000. This indicates
that ostracism did not affect risk-taking behavior collapsing across versions of the CCT. Risktaking behavior did not significantly differ for participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition
(M = 12.24, SD = 4.51) and those that received no instructions (M = 13.83, SD = 5.76), F(1, 57)
= 1.20, p = .28, ηp 2 = .023. This indicates that cognitive reappraisal instructions did not change
risk-taking behavior. Lastly, I expected that cognitive reappraisal would reduce the effects of
ostracism for each version of the CCT. Contrary to this prediction, there was a statistically nonsignificant three-way (Social condition x ER instructions x CCT version) interaction F(1, 57) =
0.35, p = .56, ηp 2 = .006, which shows that participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition did
not uniquely vary based on social condition or CCT version excluding trials when a loss card
was chosen.
Exploratory Analyses
A four-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to better understand how
participants used information for gain amount, loss amount, and number of loss cards on each
version of the CCT for risk-taking. A 2 (loss amount: 250 vs. 750) x 2 (gain amount: 10 vs. 30) x
2 (number of loss cards: 1 vs. 3) x 2 (CCT version: Hot vs. Cold) mixed factorial ANOVA was
conducted for number of cards selected. Table 5 provides marginal means and standard
deviations for risk-taking for loss amount, gain amount, number of loss cards, and CCT version.
As noted above, participants chose more cards on average in the Cold CCT (M = 13.61,
SD = 9.09) than participants on the Hot CCT (M = 9.79, SD = 7.20), F(1, 63) = 23.58, p < .001,
ηp 2 = .272. Additionally, participants chose more cards overall when there was one loss card (M
= 13.49, SD = 8.68) than when there were three loss cards (M = 9.85, SD = 7.71), F(1, 63) =
69.52, p < .001, ηp 2 = .525. These main effects were qualified by a statistically significant two-
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way interaction between number of loss cards and CCT version F(1, 63) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 =
.314. Specifically, there was a greater difference between one loss card trials (M = 12.75, SD=
6.82) and three loss card trials (M = 6.82, SD = 4.84) in the Hot CCT condition (p < .001) than
between one loss card trials (M = 14.26, SD = .9.34) and three loss card trials (M = 12.97, SD =
8.81) in the Cold CCT condition (p = 0.41). This indicates that participants noticed that the
number of loss cards were changing and used that information when determining how many
cards to choose on the CCT, especially in the Hot CCT version. Table 6 provides marginal
means and standard deviations for risk-taking for number of loss cards and CCT version.
Although participants chose a greater number of cards overall on the Cold CCT than on the Hot
CCT, the effect of number of loss cards was greater for the Hot CCT on risk-taking as can be
seen in Figure 3.
There was a non-significant main effect for loss amount F(1, 63) = .06, p = .80, ηp 2 =
.001 such that participants did not differ on the number of cards selected when the loss amount
was 250 (M =11.71, SD =8.52) or 750 (M =11.63, SD = 8.30). This indicates that loss amount
did not strongly affect participants’ risk-taking for either version of the CCT. There was also a
non-significant main effect for gain amount F(1, 63) = .01, p = .923, ηp 2 = .000 such that
participants did not differ on the number of cards selected for a gain of 10 (M = 11.65, SD =
8.52) or a gain of 30 (M = 11.69, SD = 8.30). This indicates that gain amount did not strongly
influence participants’ decisions for how many cards to select in either CCT version.
There was, however, a statistically significant interaction between loss amount and gain
amount F(1, 63) = 4.47, p = .039, ηp 2 = .066. Specifically, participants chose more cards when
the loss was 250 points and there was a win of 30 points (M = 12.04, SD = 8.38) than when there
was a loss of 250 points and a win of 10 points (M = 11.38, SD = 8.65), and conversely,
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participants chose more cards when there was a loss of 750 points with a gain of 10 points (M =
11.92, SD = 11.34) than when there was a loss of 750 points and a gain of 30 points (M = 11.34,
SD = 8.21), though pairwise comparisons indicated neither of these differences were statistically
significant (ps ≥ .19). However, given the similarity in all of these mean scores for risk-taking
and the number of interactions tested in the four-way ANOVA, this two-way interaction may
have occurred by chance and is likely not informative for understanding how participants used
gain and loss amount on the CCT. All additional interactions were statistically non-significant,
all F(1, 63) ≤ 2.00, all p ≥ .16. Given that participants’ risk-taking behavior did not differ as a
function of gain amount, loss amount, and number of loss cards for the Cold CCT, as shown in
Figure 4, and that participants chose more cards on average in the Cold CCT than the Hot CCT,
it is likely that the Cold CCT in the current study was not reflective of a deliberative risk-taking
task. Instead, it is likely that participants randomly chose numbers for the Cold CCT without
regard to the different combinations for loss amount, gain amount, and number of loss cards. For
the Hot CCT, it is clear that participants primarily used number of loss cards when selecting the
number of cards to turn over, so the Hot CCT may be a better risk-taking measure in the current
study.
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Table 2
The Means and Standard Deviations of Anger by Social Condition and Emotion-Regulation
Instructions
Social
Condition
Social
Inclusion
Ostracism

Total

Emotionregulation
Instructions
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total

M

SD

N

2.47
2.47
2.47*
4.13
4.13
4.13*
3.27
3.25
3.26

1.940
2.601
2.259
2.680
2.446
2.526
2.440
2.627
2.514

17
17
34
16
15
31
33
32
65

Note. Participants’ self-reported anger, measured on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much
so), was significantly higher in the ostracism condition than in the social inclusion condition.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 3
The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by Social Condition, Emotion-Regulation
Instructions, and CCT version
CCT
Version

Social
Condition
Social
Inclusion

Cold
CCT

Ostracism

Total
Social
Inclusion
Hot CCT

Ostracism

Total
Social
Inclusion
Total

Ostracism

Total

Emotionregulation
Instructions
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total

M

SD

N

14.30
14.17
14.24
13.66
12.05
12.91
14.00
13.18
13.62***
10.44
9.54
9.96
9.83
9.36
9.60
10.14
9.45
9.79***
12.48
11.72
12.10
11.75
10.61
11.20
12.13
11.20
11.67

2.64
2.81
2.64
5.06
5.23
5.02
3.85
4.11
3.93
2.79
1.99
2.37
2.09
2.27
2.12
2.40
2.06
2.22
3.29
3.33
3.28
4.23
4.03
4.11
3.73
3.66
3.70

9
8
17
8
7
15
17
15
32
8
9
17
8
8
16
16
17
33
17
17
34
16
15
31
33
32
65

Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected (0-32 cards for each round) for each of the
eight conditions.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 4
The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by Social Condition, Emotion-Regulation
Instructions, and CCT version Excluding Loss Trials
CCT
Version

Social
Condition
Social
Inclusion

Cold
CCT

Ostracism

Total
Social
Inclusion
Hot CCT

Ostracism

Total
Social
Inclusion
Total

Ostracism

Total

Emotionregulation
Instructions
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total
Control
Reappraisal
Total

M

SD

N

14.30
14.17
14.24
13.66
12.05
12.91
14.00
13.18
13.62
13.45
10.53
11.65
13.70
12.18
12.94
13.59
11.30
12.32
14.00
12.35
13.12
13.68
12.11
12.92
13.83
12.24
13.02

2.64
2.81
2.64
5.06
5.23
5.02
3.85
4.11
3.93
8.03
4.76
6.07
8.48
5.11
6.78
7.92
4.82
6.36
4.93
4.22
4.56
6.61
4.97
5.82
5.76
4.51
5.18

9
8
17
8
7
15
17
15
32
5
8
13
7
7
14
12
15
27
14
16
30
15
14
29
29
30
59

Note. All comparisons were non-significant, p > .05. This represents 25% of the trials as
participants continued to select cards until a loss card was encountered for 75% of the trials.

44
Table 5
The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by CCT version, Loss amount, Gain Amount,
and Number of Loss Cards

CCT
Version

Loss
Amount

Gain Amount
10

250
30

Cold
CCT

10
750
30

Number of
Loss Cards
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

Cold CCT Total
10
250
30
Hot CCT
10
750

30
Hot CCT Total

1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

M

SD

14.25
12.26
15.30
13.15
13.95
13.69
13.53
12.79
13.61***
12.71
6.41
12.54
7.32
12.97
7.19
12.80
6.34
9.79***

10.00
9.02
9.15
8.80
9.52
8.99
8.68
8.50
9.09
8.27
4.19
8.15
4.67
7.27
5.39
8.08
5.01
7.20

Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected for the parameters of the Hot and Cold CCT.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 6
The Means and Standard Deviation of Risk-taking by CCT version (Cold vs. Hot) and Number of
Loss Cards (1 vs. 3 cards)
CCT
Version
Cold CCT

Hot CCT

Total

Number of Loss
Cards
1 LC
3 LC
Total
1 LC
3 LC
Total
1 LC
3 LC
Total

M

SD

14.26***
12.97***
13.61***
12.75*
6.82*
9.79***
13.49
9.85
11.67

9.34
8.81
9.09
6.82
4.84
7.20
8.68
7.71
8.41

Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected collapsing across CCT version and the
number of loss cards. There was a main effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a
statistically significant two-way interaction between loss cards and CCT version, F(1, 63) =
28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 = .314.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Figure 1. A visual representation of the mean and standard errors for social condition and
emotion-regulation condition on self-reported anger. Participants in the ostracism condition selfreported greater feelings of anger than those in the social inclusion condition, F(1, 61) = 7.55, p
= .008, ηp 2 = .110 Self-reported anger did not differ across instruction conditions within social
conditions, F(1, 61) < .001, p = .995, ηp2 < .001
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Figure 2. A visual representation of the means and standard errors for social condition,
emotion-regulation condition, and CCT version on risk-taking. The predicted three-way
interaction was not statistically significant, F(1, 57) = 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .006.

48

Figure 3. A visual representation of participants’ mean number of cards selected and
standard errors collapsing across CCT version and the number of loss cards. There was a
main effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a statistically significant two-way
interaction between loss cards and CCT version, F(1, 63) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 = .314.
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Figure 4. Participants’ mean number of cards selected (0-32 cards for each round) and
standard errors for each of the parameters of the Hot and Cold CCT. There was a main
effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a two-way interaction between loss cards
and CCT version, F(1, 63) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 = .314.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current study was to explore the effects of ostracism and emotionregulation on risk-taking behavior. To my knowledge this study was the first conducted to
examine the effects of ostracism-related anger using the Columbia Card Task. Supporting my
prediction, ostracized participants self-reported greater feelings of anger, but not general
negative affect, compared to participants who were socially included during Cyberball. Contrary
to my prediction, no three-way interaction was found between social condition (ostracism vs.
inclusion), emotion-regulation condition (reappraisal vs. no instructions), and CCT version (Hot
vs. Cold) on risk-taking. There was no main effect of social condition or emotion-regulation
instructions on number of cards selected. There was an effect of CCT version but it was in the
opposite direction as predicted.
Ostracism
It appears that the manipulation of ostracism was effective in the current study as
ostracized participants significantly differed in self-reported feelings of being excluded, ignored,
and estimated number of throws received than included participants did. I decided to limit throws
to only 30 ball tosses because Hartgerink et al. (2015) found this to be the most common number
of throws to manipulate ostracism and that increasing number of throws between the players
decreased the effects of ostracism. Additionally, Buelow, Okdie, and Trost (2015) report that the
distortive cognitive effects of ostracism can persist 45 minutes following a manipulation of
ostracism. Falk et al. (2014) found that ostracism continued to affect risk-taking behavior in the
lab one week after being ostracized during Cyberball. Given that the experiment was only 15-20
minutes and that the ostracism manipulation check questions occurred following the CCT, it is
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likely that Cyberball effectively induced feelings of ostracism in the current study, and those
feelings persisted to the end of the experiment. Furthermore, participants in the ostracism
condition commonly expressed frustration about the Cyberball task in an informal discussion
after the experimental tasks were concluded and prior to debriefing. The manipulation of
ostracism appears to have been effective; however, it is possible the effects of ostracism on risktaking were not observed in the current study because there was not enough statistical power to
observe small differences between the social conditions.
Anger
It also appears that ostracism relative to social inclusion specifically increased feelings of
anger, replicating the finding of Svetiva et al. (2016). Participants who were ostracized reported
feeling significantly angrier than included participants. However, regardless of social condition,
self-reported anger among participants was relatively low considering a 9-point scale was
utilized. Of the 65 participants, 44 participants (67.7%) selected 4 or less for anger on the Likerttype scale. The differences between anger for social conditions were also not as large as reported
by Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2003); however, this may be because of the ambiguity
regarding whether or not the players were real people or computer simulated in the current study.
Given that there was no statistical difference between social condition and emotion-regulation
for anger, anger may not have been strong enough to be reduced by cognitive reappraisal
instructions. According to the interactive influence model of emotion and cognition, Luo and Yu
(2015) suggest that emotions impact decision-making processes when emotions are particularly
strong or when cognitive resources are weakened. Anger-induced ostracism may not have been
strong enough to affect risk-taking on the CCT. Additionally, other negative emotions such as
sadness (not measured in the current study) may reduce risk-taking behavior (Yuen & Lee,
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2003).Thus, it is possible that ostracism may have also increased feelings of sadness, which
counteracted or obscured the effects of anger on risk-taking in the current study. Given that anger
increased following ostracism, future studies should continue to isolate the specific effects of
anger instead of or in addition to general negative affect.
Negative Affect
There was no statistical difference of social condition and emotion-regulation instructions
on general negative affect. The findings of the current study support the suggestion of Svetieva et
al. (2016) that the effects of ostracism on specific negative emotions such as anger may be
obscured by only measuring negative affect. One could argue that because the PANAS
instructions asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt each emotion following the
CCT task that self-reported affect may not represent emotions felt during Cyberball. These
instructions were utilized because it was believed that participants would be unable to
retrospectively report their feelings during the Cyberball game and that negative affect from
Cyberball would persist throughout the experiment. Additionally, if the effects of ostracism on
negative affect are so weak that they do not persist several minutes, these effects are likely not
meaningful enough to inform decision-making.
Reappraisal
Cognitive reappraisal scores were calculated for participants in both the cognitive
reappraisal condition and the no emotion-regulation condition. It was predicted that participants
in the reappraisal condition would be higher on reappraisal than those in the no instruction
condition. Supporting the prediction, participants in the reappraisal condition did score higher on
the reappraisal measure than those given no instructions. However, these findings should be
interpreted with caution given the low Cronbach’s alpha observed in the current study, especially
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for participants in the Reappraisal condition. There also may have been demand characteristics
for participants in the reappraisal condition on the first reappraisal item: “I tried to see the task as
objectively as possible.” In the cognitive reappraisal instructions, participants are asked to view
the task “objectively,” which may have cued participants in the reappraisal condition to the
manipulation, and resulted in them scoring higher on the reappraisal measure. Additionally,
some participants may habitually and automatically reappraise a stressful situation without being
given instruction to do so (Panno et al., 2013), which would have reduced observed differences
in reappraisal scores. Although the manipulation check of reappraisal partially supports the
effectiveness of the cognitive reappraisal instructions, it cannot be concluded with certainty that
participants in the reappraisal condition utilized the instructions during the Cyberball task. If
participants did not utilize these instructions, this may explain why there was no effect of
emotion-regulation condition on anger and negative affect scores. Alternatively, these
instructions may not have been sufficient enough to alter negative emotions following ostracism.
Ostracism and Risk-taking on the CCT
Although we found support that ostracism via Cyberball increases feelings of anger, these
findings diverge from previous findings reported in the literature for risk-taking. For instance, I
was unable to replicate the effects of ostracism for increasing risk-taking (Buelow and Wirth,
2017; Svetieva et al., 2016). However, the type of risk-taking task in the study differed from
previously utilized risk-taking measures. Thus, it could be something about decision-making on
the Columbia Card Task which may cause ostracism-related anger to have a unique or a limited
effect for risk-taking compared to other risk-taking measures.
Additionally, though there was a main-effect of CCT version, this should be interpreted
with caution as participants’ risk-taking behavior was in the opposite direction as previously
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found for the Hot and Cold CCT versions. Specifically, participants in a neutral state have been
shown to be riskier on the Hot CCT version, selecting more cards on average, compared to the
Cold CCT version (Figner et al., 2009). In contrast, I found that participants selected more cards
on average in the Cold CCT than in the Hot CCT version. In the exploratory analysis, it became
clear that participants were not considering gain amount, loss amount, or number of loss cards on
the Cold CCT in the current study. During the debriefing process, many participants verbally
indicated that they were confused regarding the instructions for the Cold CCT version, chose
randomly, chose their favorite number, or tried to detect a pattern that did not exist. Thus, it is
unclear if participants properly understood the directions for the Cold CCT version, if
participants responded randomly, or if they understood the instructions but were not motivated to
use the information provided about the loss amount, gain amount, and number of loss cards. A
poor understanding of the Cold CCT may have reduced interest level in the task, increasing
random responding, and may have produced what appears like greater risk-taking on the Cold
CCT than the Hot CCT.
Furthermore, nearly half of the participants selected 32 cards in the Cold CCT on at least
one of the 24 trials, which could be considered a guaranteed loss even if there is only one loss
card present. However, for some combinations, participants may have interpreted the task in a
way that it would be advantageous to select all 32 cards for some combinations (e.g., 30 win
amount, 750 loss amount, 1 loss card = potential net gain of 180 points; 30 win amount, 750 loss
amount, 3 loss cards = net gain of 120 points; 10 win amount, 250 loss amount, 1 loss card = net
gain of 60 points). Thus, the ambiguity of the CCT instructions, though modified from previous
CCT versions, is a limitation of the current study. It is unclear if participants selected 32 cards
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for the Cold CCT because they were carelessly responding, did not understand the task, or
interpreted it as advantageous to do so.
Although efforts were made to remove careless responders, it appears that the Cold
version of the CCT was not an effective measure of risk-taking behavior. I suspect that the Hot
CCT, which is more interactive and easier to understand after several rounds, provided a better
measure of decision-making strategies participants used than the Cold CCT. Examining the
reliability of the Hot CCT task revealed that participants’ consistency on the Hot task was
somewhat low (Cronbach’s α = .663). Variability in responses as a function of the task parameter
values (e.g., the number of specified loss cards) is one possible contributor to this modest
reliability. The random placement of loss cards might have also decreased task reliability. More
specifically, when participants selected one of the randomly placed loss cards it immediately
terminated that round of the task, and selecting a loss card by chance in one of their first several
choices may have produced a deviation from their normal pattern of response and artificially
decreased reliability. It is also possible that participants in the current study were not as
motivated as would be hoped. To increase participant understanding and decrease careless
responders, previous studies have incorporated CCT comprehension questions and practice
rounds and paid participants based on the performance of a random round on the CCT; however,
this was not possible in the current study due to time and financial constraints. Given these
issues, future research must further explore the reliability of the task when evaluating risk-taking
behavior.
When examining the four-way ANOVA in regards to loss amount, win amount, number
of loss cards, and CCT version, participants’ risk-taking did not change based on the eight
different combinations. Given that the Cold CCT does not appear to be a good measure of risk-
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taking in the current study, it is not feasible to make comparisons between the effects of anger or
ostracism between the two CCT versions. Thus, we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the
potential divergent effects of anger for the hot and cold CCT versions, suggested by Baumann
and DeSteno (2012) and based on the Conceptual Act Model. Additionally, participants in the
current study may have been riskier than other samples given that most participants persisted on
the Hot CCT until a loss card was hit for 75% of the trials and six participants hit a loss card on
all 24 rounds.
Strengths and Limitations
There are several strengths and limitations to the current study. One strength of the study
was that participants completed the entire study on the computer, which assigned participants to
one of eight conditions unknown to the research assistant. This double-blind design minimizes
the potential for experimenter bias on risk-taking. It is also important that distractions were
minimized by completing the study in the lab, which is especially important for the manipulation
of ostracism. Steps were also taken to maximize participant focus such as providing audio
recordings for long instruction pages, having participants wear headphones, ensuring that the
program slides did not advance until the audio was finished for the instruction pages, and
limiting the experiment to 15-30 minutes to complete.
Despite the strengths of the current study, there were still several limitations. First, the
sample size for the study was small, limiting statistical power. Thus, the sample size may have
simply not been large enough to see an effect of ostracism on risk-taking. Given the questionable
efficacy of the Cold CCT in the current study, data on risk-taking for the Cold CCT may have
obscured possible effects. Finally, it seems likely that participants’ decisions were not affected
by the awareness of the ostracism manipulation due to the subtlety of the Cyberball task. A
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previous study reported that participants self-reported feelings of anger when ostracized by a
computer (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004); however, that 88% of participants in the
present study believed that the other players in the Cyberball game were computer generated
may have reduced the effects of ostracism on risk-taking.
Overall Conclusions
The first aim of this study was to extend previous findings of ostracism and risk-taking to
affective and non-affective deliberative decision-making. Becasuse we likely did not obtain the
necessary sample size to observe an effect of ostracism on risk-taking and the Cold CCT (nonaffective measure) appears to be a poor risk-taking measure in the current study, we cannot draw
conclusions about the effects of ostracism on affective and non-affective deliberative decisionmaking. Ostracism via Cyberball may not be sufficient enough to affect risk-taking on the CCT
or there could be an aspect of the CCT that is obscuring the results. In regards to the second aim
of the study, I replicated the effects of ostracism for increasing anger reported by Svetieva et al.
(2016). However, this study could not detemine if ostracism-induced anger had differential
effects on the Hot and Cold CCT because of the poor efficacy of the Cold CCT measure. Lastly,
it still remains uncertain if emotion-regulation instructions are sufficient to moderate the effects
of ostracism on risk-taking. The effectiveness and extent that the cognitive reappraisal
instructions were utilized in the current study remains uncertain. Lastly, the effects of emotionregulation on ostracism and risk-taking could not be evaluated as ostracism did not affect risktaking.
In all consideration, it is possible that ostracism via Cyberball does not affect risk-taking
behavior on the Columbia Card Task. However, before any conclusions can be made it is
important to further test the effects of ostracism and anger on the CCT and other risk-taking
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measures. It may be that a different paradigm for ostracism or a variation to the Cyberball task
(e.g., number of ball throws and deceptively informing participants that the other players in
Cyberball are real, utilizing an alternative ostracism manipulation such as Atimia) may
differentially affect risk-taking. Additionally, it is important to explore these effects in a
community sample with participants of different ages and backgrounds to increase external
validity of the findings.
Future research should seek to replicate the divergent effects of anger on the Hot and
Cold versions of the CCT as found by Baumann and DeSteno (2012). Anger differs from other
negative emotions as it is associated with appraisals of high certainty and control (Learner &
Keltner, 2000); however, inducing anger in the lab may be challenging. It is important to
determine that anger does differentially affect risk-taking for the CCT versions as only one study
has examined and reported this effect. If anger increases risk-taking on the Hot and Cold CCT
rather than having divergent effects on risk-taking, this would provide stronger support for the
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) than the Conceptual Act Model.
Additionally, alternative manipulations of ostracism should be utilized. Participants are
often samples of convinence, coming from psychology classes and thus may be familiar with
Cyberball. No participants verbally reported knowledge of the Cyberball task during the
debriefing process, but it is important that all studies in a particular area do not rest upon a single
paradigm. Futhermore, researchers should investigate the effects of different emotion-regulation
strategies and instructions on decision-making. Although Richards and Gross (2000) characterize
reappraisal as an antecedent-focused emotion-regulation strategy, it is also commonly utilized
following a full emotional reponse, and it is unknown if reappraisal is utilized after an emotional
response develops how that impacts its overall effectiveness. Future research could induce
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emotional responses, vary when and what emotion-regulation instructions are given, and
measure risk-taking behavior.
It is important to determine the extent to which ostracism affects risk-taking, especially
for adolescents and young adults who may be especially sensitive to ostracism. It could be that
ostracism affects risk-taking more in situations of uncertainty (e.g., driving) rather than objective
risk (e.g., some gambling tasks such as Blackjack) or more in the presence of others than when
alone. The type of risk-taking task used in the lab may affect what type of processing participants
predominantly rely on. For instance, participants may rely primarily on Type I processing
(automatic, gut-level) processing for risk-taking tasks under uncertainty (e.g., BART) and Type
II processing (careful, deliberative) for situations in which probabiblity of a win or loss can be
deterimined (e.g., Game of Dice task, CCT). However, we often utilize a combination of Type I
and Type II processes when making a decision, and it is necessary to further explore the extent
that ostracism and emotions affect Type I and Type II processes and the many facets of risktaking. If one domain (e.g., driving) is principally affected by risk-taking, then interventions can
be created and implemented to target risk-taking in that area for specific populations.
Given the negative consequences of ostracism and the ubiquity of ostracism and risktaking, it is important to better understand the relationship between ostracism and risk-taking. In
fact, it may be especially important to explore this relationship among adolescents and young
adults, who experience novel opportunities for risky behavior (e.g., driving behavior, sexual
decisions, financial decisions) and may be particularly sensitive to ostracism. The present study
revealed that there potentially are relations between ostracism and the emotions we experience,
and previous research suggests that these emotions might affect the way we make decisions.
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Additional research is necessary to identify the ways in which ostracism, specific emotions, and
emotion-regulation strategies impact decision-making.
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APPENDIX A
PROCEDURAL OUTLINE
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APPENDIX B
HOT COLUMBIA CARD TASK INSTRUCTIONS
You are now going to participate in a card game. In this game, you will turn over cards to win or lose points.
In each game round, you will see cards laid out on the computer screen, face down. You will decide how many of
these cards to turn over. Each card is either a gain card or a loss card. You will know how many gain cards and loss
cards there are, and how many points you will gain or lose if you turn over a gain or loss card. What you don't know
is which cards are gain cards and which are loss cards.
[Hot CCT Instructions] To flip a card, click it with the mouse. Every time you flip a gain card by you get the
points added to your round total and you have the chance to turn over another card. The first time you turn over a
loss card, the loss points are subtracted from your current point total and the round immediately ends. You can
decide to stop turning over cards at any point, as long as you have not yet turned over a loss card.
You will play a total of 24 rounds.
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APPENDIX C
COLD COLUMBIA CARD TASK INSTRUCTIONS
You are now going to participate in a card game. In this game, you will turn over cards to win or lose points.
In each game round, you will see cards laid out on the computer screen, face down. You will decide how many of
these cards to turn over. Each card is either a gain card or a loss card. You will know how many gain cards and loss
cards there are, and how many points you will gain or lose if you turn over a gain or loss card. What you don't know
is which cards are gain cards and which are loss cards.
[Cold CCT Instructions] You will indicate the number of cards (from 0 to 32) you want to turn over by clicking on
a small number button. You should make this choice as if that number of cards would then be randomly chosen to be
turned over, one at a time, until a loss card is flipped or the number of cards you chose is reached.
You will play a total of 24 rounds.

